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RIGHT, TITLE AND INTEREST IN THE TERRITORIAL SEA:
FEDERAL AND STATE CLAIMS IN THE UNITED STATES
Controversy and confusion have surrounded claims of ownership and control
in the territorial sea and the underlying subsoil. With the advent of offshore
oil wells, and the tax revenues they produced, the question of ownership as-
sumed greater significance. On one side, the states have claimed ownership on
the theory that when they entered the Union the federal government quit-
claimed the rights to the territorial sea and the adjacent subsoil back to the
various states. The federal government has claimed title to the territorial sea
on the ground that the states gave up all their rights in the territorial sea to
the federal government upon entry into the Union.
Extension of the territorial sea will intensify the controversy over licensing
facilitiessuch as superports. At present, the United States recognizes a three
mile limit to the territorial sea. The United States will probably extend its
territorial sea to a twelve mile limit, possibly as early as this summer at the
Law of the Sea Conference. This nine mile extension includes favorable sites
for superports and offshore power systems and oil reserves and other valuable
mineral resources. The leasing and development of this area offers substantial
revenues for the owner: the states, the federal government or both.
I. How FAR DOES THE TERRITORIAL SEA EXTEND
The navigable sea is generally divided into three legally distinct zones. They
are classified into the following: (1) nearest to the nation's shores are found its
internal or inland waters; (2) beyond this zone, and measured from its seaward
edge, lies a belt known as the marginal or territorial sea; and (3) outside the
territorial sea belt are the high seas.'
One of the earliest judicial assertions concerning the extent of a nation's
control over the sea was made in 1702 by the Dutch judge, Judge Bynkershock,
who stated that the best rule is that coastal state jurisdiction over the sea should
extend as far as a cannon can fire.' Control should extend to where the power
of man's weapons end, since weapons are what guarantee possession. By the
eighteenth century this test was accepted by both writers and national practices,
equating the distance of a "cannon shot" with three nautical miles, or one
marine league. 3 The three mile territorial limit was recognized by the Supreme
Court in Manchester v. Massachusetts:
We think it must be regarded as established that, as between nations, the
minimum limit of the territorial jurisdiction of a nation over tide waters is a
marine league from its coast; that bays wholly within its territory, not exceed-
'United States v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. II, 22 (1969).
22 CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 44 (Magoffin transl. 1923), cited in W. BISHOP, INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 590, n.108 (1971).
'See FULTON, SOVEREIGNTY OF THE SEA (1911); P. JESSUP, TERRITORIAL WATERS (1927);
Walker, Territorial Waters: The Cannon Shot Rule, [1945] BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 210; Kent,
Historical Origin of the Three-Mile Limit, 48 A.J.1.L. 537 (1954).
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ing two marine leagues in width at the mouth, are within this limit; and that
included in this territorial jurisdiction is the right of control over fisheries,
whether the fish be migratory, free-swimming fish, or free-moving fish, or fish
attached to or embedded in the soil.
In 1923, the Supreme Court, while considering the Eighteenth Amendment and
Prohibition Laws, reaffirmed that federal territorial jurisdiction extended from
the coast line seaward one marine league, or three geographic miles.'
But in 1951, the International Court of Justice, in deciding the Anglo-
Norwegian Fisheries Case, declared that the delimiation of territorial waters
is not a question that falls within the internal and exclusive jurisdiction of the
coastal nation.' The limitation of territorial waters always has an international
aspect and cannot be dependent merely upon the will of the coastal nation as
expressed in its own municipal law. The act of delimitation is necessarily a
unilateral act, because only the coastal nation is competent to undertake it, but
the validity of the delimitation with regard to other nations depends upon
international law. 7
The reasons why the territorial sea is accepted as a part of a nation's territory
and why an extention of such a nation's jurisdictional powers into that adjacent
sea are recognized, can be summarized as follows: (1) The security of the
littoral state demands that it should be given exclusive and absolute control
over the marginal seas adjacent to its shores; (2) for the protection of its
commercial and political interests, the coastal state must have the right to
inspect foreign ships entering its territorial waters; (3) and economic interests
demand that exclusive enjoyment of the products of the sea be regarded as a
right of the coastal nation.'
Regardless of how the seabed is divided between national and international
interests, the United States has the further problem of apportioning its share
of the seabed and territorial waters between the federal government and the
states. The states were granted a portion of the seabed with passage of the
Submerged Lands Act in 1953. But this Act did not precisely delimit the
boundary between federal and state interests.
II. FEDERAL AND STATE CLAIMS
The Supreme Court has recognized state ownership of lands beneath naviga-
ble waters9 within a state's boundary'0 on many occasions." In Pollard's Lessee
'Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 U.S. 240, 258 (1891).
'Cunard Steamship Co. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100, 122 (1923).
'Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, [1951] l.C.J. 116.
71d.
'C COLOMBOS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 73-74 (2d ed. 1951).
'Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §1301(a) (1970). The statute defines "lands beneath navigable
waters" to mean:
(I) All lands within the boundaries of each of the respective States which are covered
by nontidal waters that were navigable under the laws of the United States at the time
such State became a member of the Union, or acquired sovereignty over such lands and
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v. Hagan, the Court concluded that ownership of the navigable inland waters,
between high and low water marks, and the soil underneath was reserved by
the Constitution to the states and not granted to the federal government.,'
Furthermore, new states had the same "rights, sovereignty, and jurisdiction"
over this area as the original states.' 3
This question of ownership did not attract major concern until the advent of
offshore oil wells. The potential tax revenues associated with these offshore
wells made the question of ownership one of considerable importance.
Out of this controversy two theories emerged: the state theory and the federal
theory. It was assumed by the states, and not without reason," that the Pollard
rule would be applied to lands beneath the waters of the territorial sea. The
states claimed title as incident to a transfer to the states of local sovereignty
at the time of their admission into the Union. According to this theory, upon
entry into the Union, the federal government quitclaimed authority over the
submerged lands back to the various states.
Beginning in the 1930's the federal government, while conceding the validity
of Pollard as to inland waters, disputed its applicability to submerged lands
beyond that limit, and claimed ownership for the federal government. Under
the federal theory, when the states came into the Union they gave up all rights
they had in these lands to the federal government.
The federal government brought an action in the Supreme Court against the
waters thereafter, up to the ordinary high water mark as heretofore or hereafter modified
by accretion, erosion and reliction;
(2) All lands permanently or periodically covered by tidal waters up to but not above
the line of mean high tide and seaward to a line three geographical miles distant from
the coast line of each such State and to the boundary line of each such State where in
any case such boundary as it existed at the time such State became a member of the
Union, or as heretofore approved by Congress, extends seaward (or into the Gulf of
Mexico), beyond three geographical miles, and
(3) All filled in, made, or reclaimed lands which formerly were lands beneath navigable
waters, as hereinafter defined.
"°ld. §1301(b). The term "boundaries" as used in the statute:
. . . includes the seaward boundaries of a State or its boundaries in the Gulf of Mexico
or any of the Great Lakes as they existed at the time such State became a member of
the Union, or as heretofore approved by the Congress, or as extended or conformed
pursuant to section 1312 of this title but in no event shall the term 'boundaries' or the
term 'lands beneath navigable waters' be interpreted as extending from the coast line
more than three geographical miles into the Atlantic Ocean or the Pacific Ocean, or
more than three marine leagues into the Gulf of Mexico.
"See United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. I, 16 n.12 (1960). See generally Charneg, Judicial
Deference in the Submerged Lands Cases, 7 VAN. J. TRANS'L LAw 383, 413-46 (1974).
1244 U.S. 212, 230 (1845).
131d.
'"United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947). The Supreme Court in following the Pollard
case had previously:
• . . used language strong enough to indicate that the Court then believed that states
not only owned tidelands and soil under navigable inland waters, but also owned soils
under all navigable waters within their territorial jurisdiction, whether inland or not.
Id. at 36. See also United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. I, 16 n.13 (1960).
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State of California for a declaration of rights within the three mile marginal
belt off the California coast and for an injunction against trespass by California
upon these lands.15 The Court stated that the original thirteen colonies did not
acquire from the crown of England the title to the three mile marginal ocean
belt or the land underlying it."6 Even if the original states did acquire elements
of sovereignty from the English crown by their revolution against it, the State
of California could not claim interest in the marginal belt along the coastline,
by reason of its alleged admission into statehood on an equal footing with the
thirteen original states.17 The protection and control of the three-mile marginal
ocean belt off the coast of the United States is a function of national external
sovereignty. 8 A state's exercise of its local police power in part of the three-
mile marginal ocean belt within its boundaries did not detract from the federal
government's paramount rights in, and power over, such an area. 9 In conclu-
sion, the Court held that the State of California was not the owner in fee simple
of the marginal ocean belt along its coast, and that the federal government,
rather than the individual state, has paramount rights in, and power over such
belt; an incident to which is full and complete dominion over the resources of
the soil under that water area, including oil.2 0 This first encounter between these
competing theories ended with the Supreme Court siding with the federal
theory.
After this decree was entered, the federal government requested a clarifica-
tion of the award. California claimed that certain areas with substantial oil
mining activity were within California's inland waters. The Court appointed a
Special Master,' and directed him to determine the line of inland waters for
seven specified segments of the California coast.2"
The Supreme Court directed the Special Master to recommend answers to
the following questions:
"
5 United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947).
"Id. at 31.
17d.a
"Ild. at 34.
"Id. at 36.
11id. at 38. In United States v. California, 332 U.S. 804 (1947) (per curiam), the Court states:
The United States of America is now, and has been at all times pertinent hereto,
possessed of paramount rights in, and full dominion and power over, the lands, minerals
and other things underlying the Pacific Ocean lying seaward of the ordinary low-water
mark on the coast of California, and outside of the inland waters, extending seaward
three nautical miles . . . The State of California has no title thereto or property interest
therein.
Id. at 805.
"The late William H. Davis of New York City.
"United States v. California, 342 U.S. 891 (1951). Inland waters are subject to complete sover-
eignty of nations, as much as if they were part of its land territory, and a coastal nation has
privilege even to exclude foreign vessels altogether. United States v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 11, 22
(1969). See also van Panhuys and van Ende Boas, Legal Aspects of Private Broadcasting, 60
A.J.I.L. 303 (1966) (regarding the authority of a nation to deny access to its waters to foreign
vessels).
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Question I-What is the status (inland waters or open sea) of particular chan-
nels and other water areas between the mainland and offshore islands, and, if
inland waters, then by what criteria are the inland water limits of any such
channel or other water area to be determined?
Question 2-Are particular segments in fact bays or harbors constituting
inland waters and from what landmarks are the lines marking the seaward
limits of bays, harbors, rivers, and other inland waters to be drawn?
Question 3-By what criteria is the ordinary low water mark on the coast of
California to be ascertained?2
The Report of the Special Master submitted answers to all three questions.
2
'
The Special Master defined inland waters according to the criteria being ap-
plied by the United States in the conduct of its foreign affairs at the date of
the Court's decree. In response to the first question, the Special Master deter-
mined that the channel between the mainland and the offshore islands were not
inland waters. The Special Master answered the second question by applying
a rule that only a bay having a closing line across its mouth less than ten miles
in length and enclosing a sufficient water area to satisfy the Boggs Formula
would be referred to as inland waters, with the qualification that a bay which
had been historically considered inland waters would so continue to be
considered as such.2" Under this rule, none of the seven particular coastal
segments under consideration was a bay constituting inland waters. The Special
Master determined the ordinary low water mark on the coast of California to
be the intersection of the shoreline with the plane of the mean of all low waters
established by the United States Coast and Geodetic Survey from observations
made over a period of 18.6 years.26
The following year, the Submerged Lands Act was enactedY The purposes
of the Submerged Lands Act are described in its title:
To conform and establish the titles of the States to lands beneath navigable
waters within state boundaries and to the natural resources within such lands
and waters, to provide for the use and control of said lands and resources, and
"United States v. California, 342 U.S. 891 (1951).2
'Report of the Special Master at 2-5, United States v. California, 344 U.S. 872 (1952)
[hereinafter cited as Report]. The conclusions of the Report are found in United States v. Califor-
nia, 381 U.S. 139, 144-45 n.6 (1965). The Report was neither adopted, modified nor rejected by
the Supreme Court but was simply allowed to lie dormant until 1964. Id. at 148-49. In United
States v. California, the Supreme Court approved the recommendations of the Special Master,
subject to the modifications set out in that opinion. Id. at 177; see p. infra.
"To determine whether a coastal indentation is of sufficient depth and shape to be inland water,
the Boggs formula would (I) draw the closing line across the mouth of the indentation; (2) draw a
belt around the shore of the indentation (similar to a small marginal belt) having a width equal to
one-fourth the length of the closing line across the entrance; (3) compare the remaining area inside
the closing line with the area of a semicircle having a diameter equal to one-half of the length of
the closing line, and if the enclosed area is larger than that of the semicircle, the indentation is
inland water. Boggs, Delimitation of the Territorial Sea, 24 A.J.I.L. 541, 548 (1930).
2 United States v. California, 381 U.S. 139, 144-45 n.6 (1965).
243 U.S.C. § 1301 (1970).
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to confirm the jurisdiction and control of the United States over the natural
resources of the seabed of the Continental Shelf seaward of State boundaries.28
The Submerged Lands Act accomplished these objectives by extending state
control. First, the Act relinquished to the states the interest of the United States
in all lands beneath the navigable waters within state boundaries." Second, the
Act defined that area in terms of state boundaries as they existed at the time
such state became a member of the Union, or as heretofore approved by the
United States Congress, not extending, however, seaward from the coastline
of any state for more than three marine leagues 3 in the Gulf of Mexico or
more than three geographical miles into either the Atlantic or Pacific
Oceans. 3' Third, a seaward boundary of each state of three geographical miles
was confirmed, without "questioning or in any manner prejudicing the exist-
ence of any state's seaward boundary beyond three geographical miles if it was
so provided by its constitution or laws prior to or at the time such state became
a member of the Union, or if it has been heretofore approved by Congress.
'32
However, the Act did not remove all incidents of control by the government.
For purposes of navigation, commerce, national defense, and international
affairs, the United States reserved all constitutional powers of regulation and
control over the areas within which the proprietary interests of the states are
recognized. 33 Furthermore, the federal government retained all rights in sub-
2167 Stat. 29 (1953).
243 U.S.C. §1311 (1970):
(a) It is determined and declared to be in the public interest that (1) title to and
ownership of the lands beneath navigable waters within the boundaries of the respective
States, and the natural resources within such lands and waters, and (2) the rights and
power to manage, administer, lease, develop, and use the said lands and natural re-
sources all in accordance with applicable State law be, and they are, subject to the
provisions hereof, recognized, confirmed, established, and vested in and assigned to the
respective States or the persons who were on June 5, 1950, entitled thereto under the
law of the respective States in which the land is located, and the respective grantees,
lessees, or successors in interest thereof:
(b) (I) The United States releases and relinquishes unto said States and persons
aforesaid, except as otherwise reserved herein, all right, title and interest of the United
States, if any it has, in and to all said lands, improvements, and natural resources; (2)
the United States releases and relinquishes all claims of the United States, if any it has,
for money or damages arising out of any operations of said States or persons pursuant
to State authority upon or within said lands and navigable waters. ...
"Three marine leagues are equivalent to nine marine, nautical or geographical miles. A conver-
sion can also be made to English, statute or land miles. One English, statute, or land mile equals
approximately .87 marine, nautical or geographical miles. Therefore, three marine leagues refers
to approximately 10.35 land miles.
3143 U.S.C. § 1301(a)(2) (1970).
321d. § 1312.
"
3
1Id. § 1314(a).
The United States retains all its navigational servitude and rights in and powers of
regulation and control of said lands and navigable waters for the constitutional purposes
of commerce, navigation, national defense, and international affairs, all of which shall
be paramount to, but shall not be deemed to include, proprietary rights of ownership,
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merged lands lying beyond those areas to the seaward limits of the continental
shelf.31
Thus, under this Act, the United States relinquished35 to the coastal states
all of its rights in submerged lands within certain geographical limits and
confirmed its own rights therein beyond such limits. This Act was upheld in
Alabama v. Texas38 as a constitutional exercise of Congress' power to dispose
of federal property.
Both federal and state interests found support for their positions in the Act.
States asserted that this Act was a congressional recognition that broad rights
to these lands and waters had always existed in the states and that upon each
state's entry into the Union the federal government had relinquished these
broad rights to the state rather than retaining them in the federal government.
The federal theory maintained that this Act merely granted limited authority
over these lands back to the states, leaving most aspects of authority still vested
in the hands of the federal government.
Several cases have come before the Supreme Court involving the interpreta-
tion of this Act. In 1960, the Court was called upon to hear the case of United
States v. Louisiana.3 7 The federal government filed this action asking the
Court to declare that the federal government had exclusive possession and
authority over the land and natural resources underlying the Gulf of Mexico
more than three geographical miles seaward from the coast of each State. The
Court held that the Submerged Lands Act had made each coastal State the
owner of the submerged lands to a distance of three geographical miles from
the coast.3 8 However, no boundary in excess of this distance had been estab-
lished ipso facto for any state. 9 The Act provided each Gulf State the right
to prove that its boundary extended more than three miles and the existence
of such a boundary was to the proved in judicial proceedings."0 Accordingly,
or the rights of management, administration, leasing, use, and development of the lands
and natural resources which are specifically recognized, confirmed, established, and
vested in and assigned to the respective States and others by section 1311 of this title.
31 d. § 1302.
Nothing in this chapter shall be deemed to affect in any wise the rights of the United
States to the natural resources of that portion of the subsoil and seabed of the Continen-
tal Shelf lying seaward and outside of the area of lands beneath navigable waters, as
defined in section 1301 of this title, all of which natural resources appertain to the United
States, and the jurisdiction and control of which by the United States is hereby con-
firmed.
Congress passed, later in the same year, the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C.
§§ 1331-1343 (1970), which provides for federal exploitation of the submerged lands of the Conti-
nental Shelf beyond those lands granted to the states by the Submerged Lands Act.
"However, in subsequent cases construing the Submerged Lands Act the United States has
asserted that the Submerged Lands Act merely granted these submerged lands to the coastal states
instead of relinquishing them as the states claim.
-437 U.S. 272 (1954).
37363 U.S. I (1960).
111d. at 24.
391d. at 25.
'old.
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the Court held that the Act granted to Texas the submerged lands in the Gulf
of Mexico within three marine leagues from her coast4 but did not grant
Louisiana, Mississippi or Alabama any rights in the submerged lands beyond
three geographical miles from their respective coasts.4" The submerged lands
beyond these boundaries were declared to be owned by the federal govern-
ment.4 3 In a decision handed down on the same day as United States v.
Louisiana, the Court held that the Submerged Lands Act granted to Florida a
three marine league belt of submerged lands under the Gulf of Mexico seaward
from its coastline; beyond this belt all submerged lands were owned by the
federal government."
The Submerged Lands Act set forth a two-fold test for determining seaward
boundaries of states beyond three geographical miles; boundaries which existed
at the time of admission into the Union and boundaries which were theretofore
approved by Congress. State boundaries were to be determined by the historic
action taken with respect to them jointly by Congress and the state itself. The
framers of the Act determined that such joint action would fix the states'
boundaries against subsequent change without their consent and thereby confer
upon the states the long-standing equities which the Act was intended to recog-
nize.45
In 1965, the case of United States v. California41 came before the Supreme
Court. The Court was required to determine the extent of submerged lands
which were "granted" to the State of California by the Submerged Lands Act
of 1953, and in particular to declare whether specified bodies of water on the
California coast were "inland waters" as contained in the Convention of the
Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone,'47 as approved by the Senate and
ratified by the President, were to be adopted for purposes of the previously
passed Submerged Lands Act.
A year later,'48 the Court declared that the Special Master's recommenda-
tions would be modified to provide that the State of California has no title
thereto or property interest therein to the subsoil and seabed of the Continental
Shelf, more than three geographical miles seaward from the nearest point or
points on the coastline; that waters between islands, roadsteads; and waters
between islands and the mainland are not per se inland waters and that the
United States is not entitled, as against California, to any right, title or interest
"Id. at 64.
111d. at 83.
43Id.
"United States v. Florida, 363 U.S. 122, 129 (1960).
4United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1, 27-29 (1960). See also United States v. Alaska, 352 F.
Supp. 815 (D. Alas. 1972). The Alaska opinion held that under general principles of international
law, Cook Inlet was an "historic bay;" therefore, title to its subsurface resources vested in the State
of Alaska in accordance with the Submerged Lands Act.
"6381 U.S. 139 (1965).
4 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, April 29, 1958, [19641 2 U.S.T.
1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205.
"United States v. California, 382 U.S. 448 (1966),
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in any of these submerged lands, improvements and natural resources except
as provided by § 5 of the Submerged Lands Act."
'lid. at 449-52. The Supreme Court concluded that:
I. As against the State of California and all persons claiming under it, the subsoil and
seabed of the continental shelf, more than three geographical miles seaward from the
nearest point or points on the coast line, at all times pertinent hereto have appertained
and now appertain to the United States and have been and now are subject to its
exclusive jurisdiction, control and power of disposition. The State of California has no
title thereto or property interest therein.
2. As used herein, "coast line" means-
(a) The line of mean lower low water on the mainland, on islands, and on low-tide
elevations lying wholly or partly within three geographical miles from the line of mean
lower low water on the mainland or an island; and
(b) The line marking the seaward limit of inland waters.
The coast line is to be taken as heretofore or hereafter modified by natural or artificial
means, and includes the outermost permanent harbor works that form an integral part
of the harbor system within the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention on the Territorial
Seas and the Contiguous Zone, T.I.A.S. No. 5639.
3. As used herein-
(a) "Island" means a naturally-formed area of land surrounded by water, which is
above the level of mean high water;
(b) "Low-tide elevation" means a naturally-formed area of land surrounded by
water at mean lower low water, which is above the level of mean lower low water, but
not above the level of mean high waters;
(c) "Mean lower low water" means the average elevation of all the daily lower low
tides occurring over a period of 18.6 years;
(d) "Mean high water" means the average elevation of all the high tides occurring
over a period of 18.6 years;
(e) "Geographical mile" means a distance of 1852 meters (6076.10333 U.S. Survey
Feet or approximately 6076.11549 International Feet).
4. As used herein, "inland waters" means waters landward of the baseline of the
territorial sea, which are now recognized as internal waters of the United States under
the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone. The inland waters
referred to in paragrah 2(b) hereof include-
(a) Any river or stream flowing directly into the sea, landward of a straight line
across its mouth:
(b) Any port, landward of its outermost permanent harbor works and a straight line
across its entrance:
(c) Any "historic bay", as that term is used in paragraph 6 of Article 7 of the
Convention, defined essentially as a bay over which the United States has traditionally
asserted and maintained dominion with the acquiescence of foreign nations;
(d) Any other bay (defined as a well-marked coastal indentation having such pene-
tration, in proportion to the width of its entrance, as to contain landlocked waters, and
having an area, including islands within the bay, at least as great as the area of a
semicircle whose diameter equals the length of the closing line across the entrance of
the bay, or the sum of such closing lines if the bay has more than one entrance), landward
of a straight line across its entrance or, if the entrance is more than 24 geographical
miles wide, landward of a straight line not over 24 geographical miles long, drawn within
the bay so as to enclose the greatest possible amount of water. An estuary of a river is
treated in the same way as a bay.
5. In drawing a closing line across the entrance of any body of inland water having
pronounced headlands, the line shall be drawn between the points where the plane of
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The Supreme Court rejected a claim asserted by Texas that its coastline
extended to the seaward edge of the artificial jetties constructed by Texas in
the Gulf of Mexico after 1845 when Texas was admitted to the Union.s0 This
holding relied on a provision of the Act that the three-leagues claim must be
measured to such boundary as it existed at the time the State became a member
of the Union. Therefore, Texas was not entitled to lease certain submerged
lands, portion of which lay more than three leagues from any part of the natural
shoreline of Texas, but within three leagues of the jetties s.5
In 1969,52 the Supreme Court held that the part of Louisiana's coastline
"marks" the seaward limit of inland waters5 3 is to be drawn in accordance with
the definitions set forth in the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the
Contiguous Zone.54
Ill. THE FEDERAL WATER QUALITY IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 1970: EXERCISE
OF A STATE'S POLICE POWER
In addition to the question of the ownership of the submerged lands, a
question exists regarding the authority the federal government and states may
exercise in the territorial sea. The debate over state authority has concerned
regulation of fisheries, international shipping traffic, oil well land leasing and
particularly pollution control.
mean lower low water meets the outermost extension of the headlands. Where there is
no pronounced headland, the line shall be drawn to the point where the line of mean
lower low water on the shore is intersected by the bisector of the angle formed where a
line projecting the general trend of the line of mean lower low water along the open coast
meets a line projecting the general trend of the line of mean lower low water along the
tributary waterway.
6. Roadsteads, waters between islands, and waters between islands and the mainland
are not per se inland waters.
12. With the exception provided by § 5 of the Submerged Lands Act, 67 Stat. 32, 43
U.S.C. § 1313 (1964 ed.), and subject to the powers reserved to the United States by
§ 3(d) and § 6 of said Act, 67 Stat. 31, 32, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1311(d) and 1314 (1964 ed.),
the State of California is entitled, as against the United States, to the title to and
ownership of the tidelands along its coast (defined as the shore of the mainland and of
islands, between the line of mean high water and the line of mean lower low water) and
the submerged lands, minerals, other natural resources and improvements underlying the
inland waters and the waters of the Pacific Ocean within three geographical miles
seaward from the coast line and bounded on the north and south by the northern and
southern boundaries of the State of California, including the right and power to manage,
administer, lease, develop and use the said lands and natural resources all in accordance
with applicable State law. The United States is not entitled, as against the State of
California, to any right, title or interest in or to said lands, improvements and natural
resources except as provided by § 5 of the Submerged Lands Act.
"United States v. Louisiana, 389 U.S. 155 (1967).
"Id. at 161.
52United States v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 11 (1969).
SId.
"
4Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1301(c) (1970).
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In Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc.,55 the Court addressed
itself to two issues. First, did the Federal Water Quality Improvement Act of
1970 [hereinafter cited as WQIA]s5 preempt the Florida Oil Spill Prevention
and Pollution Control Act of 1970 [hereinafter cited as Florida Act]?57 Second,
can a state validly exercise its police power to control marine pollution? The
broader question of whether the paramount right of control over the territorial
sea lies in the federal government or the states was not directly presented to
the Supreme Court.
In this case, the Appellees, constituting merchant shippers, world shipping
associations, barge and towing companies and owners of oil terminal facilities
located in Florida, brought an action to enjoin application of the Florida Act.
The appellees challenged the validity of the Florida Act on the ground that it
was preempted by federal legislation.5" The State of Florida maintained that
her interests were broader than the named defendants and intervened as a party
defendant. The appellants contended that federal oil spill legislation was defi-
cient, that Congress desired to encourage and not preempt state regulatory
action and that Florida's interest in preserving its environment overrode the
predilection for maritime uniformity. The case was presented to the Supreme
Court on appeal from a holding by a three judge district court that the Florida
Act was an unconstitutional intrusion into the federal maritime domain. 9 The
Supreme Court reversed finding no constitutional or statutory impediment to
411 U.S. 325 (1973). See also Recent Decision, 4 GA. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 216 (1974).
"33 U.S.C. § Ii61 (1970), amending 33 U.S.C. § 1151 (1970). Basically, this Act subjects
owners or operators of vessels or onshore and offshore terminal facilities, to liability without fault
for oil spills. The WQIA allows only four defenses against strict liability: (I) acts of God, (2) acts
of war, (3) governmental negligence, and (4) acts or omissions of third parties. Id. § 1161(")(I)-
(3). Absent these defenses, liability is set at the federal government's cost in cleaining up the spill,
not to exceed $100 per gross ton of such vessel or $14,000,000, whichever is less. Id. The liability
of an onshore or offshore terminal facility is limited to $8,000,000. Id. If the spillage results from
willful negligence, liability for cleanup costs can be unlimited. Id. Also, owners or operators of
vessels must give evidence of financial responsibility to meet the liability to the U.S.
Id. § 1161(p)(I). In addition, the President is authorized to issue regulations requiring vessels and
terminal facilities to maintain equipment for the prevention of oil spills. Id. § 11616).
SFLA. STAT. ANN. § 376 (Supp. 1972). Since the WQIA did not provide for state recovery for
oil spill damage and believing the limit on liability was too low, the Florida Legislature passed
this Act to support and complement the WQIA. Id. § 376.02(b). The Florida Act imposes unlim-
ited, strict liability upon a vessel or terminal facility which discharges oil or any other pollutant
into the state's territorial waters. Id. § 376.12. The Florida Act further requires every owner or
operator of a vessel or terminal facility to pay all cleanup costs or damages which may result from
the discharge of pollutants and to maintain satisfactory evidence of financial responsibility to
satisfy such liability. Id. § 376.14(l). Finally, the Florida State Department of Natural Resources
is empowered to set regulations with respect to containment gear and other equipment which must
be maintained by vessels and terminal facilities for the prevention of oil spills. Id. § 376.07(2)(a).
-1335 F. Supp. 1241, 1244-45 (M.D. Fla. 1971). Plaintiffs also contended that the Florida Act:
(1) violated the constitutional guarantee of maritime uniformity, (2) violated federal supremacy in
admiralty law, (3) violated the Commerce Clause since it sought to regulate foreign and interstate
commerce and (4) denied plaintiffs due process and equal protection.
11335 F. Supp. 1241, 1251 (1971).
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prevent a state from imposing "any requirement or liability"60 in regards to the
spillage of oil into any waters of the state.
Prior Supreme Court decisions have established various rules regarding
preemption. Before federal legislation can preempt a particular field of regula-
tion, it must first be determined that the given congressional action has been
undertaken pursuant to one of the powers delegated to Congress by the Consti-
tution.61 The Constitution, article II, section 2,62 read in context with article
I, section 8, grants Congress the power to alter maritime law through legisla-
tion .13 The Supreme Court has taken several approaches to the preemption
issue. If a state statute field conflicts with one or more material aspects of a
federal statute, then the state statute is preempted. 4 The preemption question
also arises in situations where Congress has legislated only in a limited area of
a particular field and a state passes a statute to regulate the untouched portion
of the field. In such a situation, it must be determined whether the federal
government intended no further regulation in the field or that Congress alone
could decide when further regulation was necessary. State legislation is invalid
if it is determined that Congress has occupied the field with either of these
intentions. 5 Another test used by the Supreme Court is whether the federal
scheme is so pervasive as to cover the entire field and preempt state regula-
tion."6
In Askew the Court did not have to resort to one of these preemption tests.
The WQIA does not preclude state action but explicitly recognizes the right
of states to act.67 The Conference Report of the WQIA states:
:033 U.S.C. § 1161(o)(2) (1970).
'Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143, 1146 (1971). See also Rice v. Santa
Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 229-30 (1947).
12This provision of the Constitution extends the judicial power of the federal courts to "all cases
of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction." It was recognized that some remedies in the maritime
field of law had been traditionally administered by common law courts of the original states. This
role of the states in the administration of maritime law was preserved by the "savings clause."
Judiciary Act of 1789, §9, I Stat. 76, 77 (1789); see The Hamilton, 207 U.S. 398, 404 (1907); New
Jersey Steam Navigation Co. v. Merchants' Bank, 47 U.S. 343, 390 (1848).
"The Thomas Barium, 293 U.S. 21, 42 (1934); Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205,
214-15 (1917): In re Garnett, 141 U.S. I, 14 (1890); Butler v. Boston & Savannah Steamship Co.,
130 U.S. 527, 556-57 (1889).
:'Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
' Oregon-Washington R.R. & Navig. Co. v. Washington, 270 U.S. 87 (1926); Southern Ry. v.
Railroad Comm'n, 236 U.S. 439 (1915).
"Amalgamated Ass'n of Street, Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S.
274 (1971): Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468 (1959).
6733 U.S.C. § 1161(o) (1970) provides,
(I) Nothing in this section shall affect or modify in any way the obligations of any
owner or operator of any vessel, or of any owner or operator of any onshore facility or
offshore facility to any person or agency under any provision of law for damages to any
publicly-owned or privately-owned property resulting from a discharge of any oil or
from the removal of any such oil.
(2) Nothing in this section shall be construed as preempting any State or political
subdivision thereof from imposing any requirement or liability with respect to the dis-
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. . . any State would be free to provide requirements and penalties similar to
those imposed by this section or additional requirements and penalties. These,
however, would be separate and independent from those imposed by this sec-
tion and would be enforced by the States through its courts."
In addition to recognizing the rights of states, the WQIA presupposes a coordi-
nated effort with states to combat marine oil pollution. 9 Because Congress only
dealt with cleanup costs incurred by the federal government, the states were
left free to impose liability for damage suffered by states and private interests.
Since the WQIA explicitly recognized the rights of states in this area, the
Court turned to a closely related issue of whether a state could validly exercise
its police power in the federal area of maritime law. Admiralty tort jurisdiction
has traditionally depended upon the locality where the tort occurred and not
upon the nature of the tort.70 In 1948 Congress passed the Admiralty Extension
Act.7' The purpose of this Act was to extend admiralty jurisdiction to cases
where damage, consummated on land, was caused by a vessel on navigable
waters.7 2 The Admiralty Extension Act was not designed to eliminate any state
remedies but simply made available a concurrent remedy in admiralty law."
State regulation has been permitted to supplement the admiralty area when
the State regulation does not directly conflict with federal law.7 But two cases,
Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen," and Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart," have
limited the extent to which a state may regulate in the admiralty area. The
Supreme Court in Jensen held that the widow of a deceased maritime worker
could receive no award under New York's workmen's compensation law. The
New York statute was declared unconstitutional since the deceased maritime
charge of oil into any waters within such State.
(3) Nothing in this section shall be construed . . . to affect any State or local law not
in conflict with this section.
"H.R. REP. No. 91-940, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1970).
"33 U.S.C. .§ 1161(c)(2),(e) (1970).
7 Atlantic Transport Co. v. Imbrovek, 234 U.S. 52, 59 (1914). Prior to 1948, if the damage or
injury occurred on land then admiralty jurisdiction was not available. If the injury or damage
occurred on the high seas or navigable waters then the tort was within the admiralty jurisdiction.
The Plymouth, 70 U.S. 20, 35 (1865) (admiralty jurisdiction did not exist where the cause of
damage originated on water but was done wholly upon the land). See also Martin v. West, 222
U.S. 191 (1911); Recent Decisions, 4 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 232, 239 (1974).
7'46 U.S.C. § 740 (1970).
"Gebhard v. S.S. Hawaiian Legislator, 425 F.2d 1303, 1306 (1970); Interlake S.S. Co. v.
Nielsen, 338 F.2d 879, 882 (1964).
"State, Department of Fish and Game v. S.S. Bournemouth, 307 F. Supp. 922, 925 (1969); cf.
Victory Carriers Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S. 202, 214 (1971), where the Court states, "at least in the
absence of explicit congressional authorization, we shall not extend the historic boundaries of the
maritime law."
"Sherlock v. Ailing, 93 U.S. 99 (1876); Steamboat Co. v. Chase, 83 U.S. 522 (1872). If there is
a conflict with the general policy of maritime law then state law becomes inapplicable. Wharton
v. T.A. Loving & Co., 344 F.2d 739 (4th Cir. 1969); Massaro v. United States Lines Co., 307 F.2d
299 (3rd Cir. 1962); Holland v. Steag, Inc., 143 F. Supp. 203 (D. Mass. 1956).
75244 U.S. 205 (1916).
7-253 U.S. 149 (1919).
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worker was on a vessel in navigable waters, making admiralty the exclusive
remedy. Congress sought to nullify the effects of this decision by amending
section 9 of the Judiciary Act to give claimants the right to remedies under state
workmen's compensation statutes." But in Knickerbocker Ice, the Supreme
Court held that Congress had no power to allow states to grant a remedy in
this area.7" These two cases stood for the proposition that federal rules of
maritime law displace rules of common law in actions brought under the saving
to suitors clause of section 9 of the Judiciary Act.
Since the 1940's, this denial of state power has been relaxed.', In Just v.
Chambers, the Court held that states have authority to act in the maritime area
as long as the state action does not conflict with federal laws or the essential
features of an exclusive federal jurisdiction. The Court required uniformity
only if the essential features of exclusive federal jurisdiction are involved."0 The
line that separates the scope of federal power and state power has not been
defined with exact precision. A state's exercise of its police power is superseded
by federal legislation only where the repugnance or conflict is so direct and
positive that the two acts cannot be reconciled or consistently stand together.8'
With the lack of a definite rule to determine the scope of a state's power in
advance of litigation each case has been considered on its own facts and sur-
rounding circumstances. 2 Where a federal agency has conducted hearings and
determined that the case falls within federal jurisdiction then state regulations
are preempted. But where no hearings have been conducted by a federal agency
then the applicable state law is presumed constitutional." Since there was no
hearing by a federal agency in Askew, the Florida Act was presumed constitu-
tional.
In the majority opinion, Justice Douglas limited the rule of Jensen and
Knickerbocker Ice to cases involving vessels on navigable waters. Therefore,
the rule in those cases cannot be extended to apply to cases involving injuries
on or to the shore by ships on navigable waters.8 4 In these ship-to-shore cases
"Act of Oct. 6, 1917, ch. 97, I 40 Stat. 395 (1917), amending Judiciary Act of 1789, § 9, 1 Stat.
76, 77 (1789).
7 After the Court's decision in Knickerbocker Ice, Congress re-amended the saving clause to
preserve "to claimants for compensation for injuries to or death of persons other than the master
or members of the crew of a vessel, their rights and remedies under the workmen's compensation
law of any State." Act of June 10, 1922, ch. 216, § I, 42 Stat. 634 (1922). This amendment did
not achieve the desired result. In Washington v. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219 (1924), the Court
held that Congress would have to prescribe general rules if it wanted to legislate for maritime
employment. To settle the problem, Congress turned to a federal compensation remedy and passed
the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1958).
Under this Act, on the land side of the line established in Jensen, state compensation would be
available; on the water side of the line, federal compensation would be available.
"Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 373-74 (1959).
90312 U.S. 383, 392 (1940).
"'Kelley v. Washington, 302 U.S. I, 10 (1937).
2 Davis v. Department of Labor, 317 U.S. 249, 253 (1942); Baizley Iron Works v. Span, 281
U.S. 222, 230 (1930).
"Davis v. Department of Labor, 317 U.S. 249, 256-57 (1942).
"Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325, 329 (1973).
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the Admiralty Extension Act does not preempt state law.85 Accordingly, states
may exercise their police powers, as Florida did, to enact statutory schemes to
govern ship-to-shore torts such as oil pollution. States may now cleanup their
waters and recover their costs at least within federal limits so far as vessels are
concerned."'
The Supreme Court did not specifically answer the broad underlying issue
of whether the paramount right of control over the territorial sea lies in the
federal government or the states. In regard to this unanswered issue does
Askew support the federal theory or the state theory? One view is that Askew
supports the federal theory. The State of Florida could regulate ship-to-shore
pollution only because the WQIA impliedly provided that the states could act
in this area. Florida had authority to regulate the territorial sea only because
Congress impliedly gave this right to the states. By appropriate congressional
action this right could be removed from the states. The other view is that Askew
recognized the validity of the state theory. The WQIA recognized a right that
has always existed in the states; it did not grant any new rights to the states.
The Supreme Court noted that the major concern was with the prevention and
cleanup of marine oil pollution, even at the risk of destroying federal uniform-
ity of maritime law. States have always had this right and it cannot be taken
away by the federal government.
IV. FEDERAL LEGISLATION SINCE Askew
Congress has recently enacted three statutes which deal with the relationship
between federal and state governmental powers in the territorial zone. The
Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972,7 supports the
Supreme Court decision in Askew. This Act specifically allows states to impose
higher standards of care for control of water pollution, than the federal stan-
dards and requirements imposed by this Act.88 The congressional purpose be-
hind this Act was to encourage compacts between the states in order to develop
a uniform system of law for the prevention and control of pollution.8
Nacirema Operating Co. v. Johnson, 396 U.S. 212 (1969). The Admiralty Extension Act
extended the admiralty tort jurisdiction only to ship-caused injuries on a pier; ship-to-shore injuries
are under state jurisdiction.
"Currently, it is not clear whether the WQIA overrides the Limitation of Liability Act, 46
U.S.C. 181-89 (1970). This Act limits the liability of owners of vessels to the value of the vessel
and freight pending. It should be noted that this Act does not affect the liability of owners of
terminal facilities. The Solicitor General has stated that the Limitation of Liability Act, so far as
vessels are concerned, would override the Florida Act. However, the Court in Askew refused to
decide whether the amounts Florida could recover were limited to those specified in the WQIA
and whether in turn the WQIA removed the pre-existing limitations of liability in the Limitation
of Liability Act.
733 U.S.C. § 1251 (Supp. II, 1972), amending 33 U.S.C. § 1161 (1970).
-1ld. § 1370.
11d. § 1253(a). Under this Act, the States are to lead the national effort to prevent and control
water pollution. The federal role was limited to that of supporting and assisting the States. See S.
REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1972).
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The Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972,90 takes a
somewhat different approach. Instead of providing for concurrent control be-
tween the various states and the federal government, this Act provides, "no
State shall adopt or enforce any rule or regulation relating to any activity
regulated by this subchapter."9 ' Therefore, with regards to the dumping of
materials92 into ocean seas lying seaward of the international baseline, the
federal government has exclusive control. However, this Act does not regulate
oil or sewage from vessels" and does not regulate the dumping of fish wastes.94
The third Act is the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972. This Act is
designed to encourage and assist the states in the development and implementa-
tion of management programs for the territorial zone. 5 This assistance is to
be in the form of grants to aid in development and administrative costs for these
programs." In order to receive one of these grants a state's management plan
must meet federal requirements and be approved by the Secretary of Com-
merce.97 It is not mandatory that state management plans follow federal re-
quirements. This is found in the language of the Act which states:
(e) Nothing in this chapter shall be construed:
(I) to diminish either Federal or state jurisdiction, responsibility, or rights
in the field of planning, development, or control of water resources, submerged
lands, or navigable waters.
(f) . . . nothing in this chapter shall in any way affect any requirement (1)
-33 U.S.C. § 1401, 86 Stat. 1052 (Supp. II, 1972).
"d. § 1416(d). The federal government will regulate the dumping and transportation for dump-
ing of waste and material in ocean-waters beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the United States
over which it may exercise control under accepted principles of international law. S. REP. No. 451,
92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1972). However, the Ocean Dumping Act does not extend federal authority
over the deposit of oyster shells or other materials pursuant to a state program for the purpose of
developing, maintaining or harvesting fisheries resources. 33 U.S.C. § 1402(f) (Supp. 11, 1972).
'
21d. § 1402(c).
"Material" means matter of any kind or description, including, but not limited to,
dredged material, solid waste, incinerator, residue, garbage, sewage, sewage sludge,
munitions, radiological, chemical, and biological warfare agents, radioactive materials,
chemicals, biological and laboratory waste, wreck or discarded equipment, rock, sand,
excavation debris, and industrial, municipal, agricultural, and other waste; but such term
does not mean oil within the meaning of section II of the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act and does not mean sewage from vessels within the meaning of section 13
of such Act.
:
3 d.
"d. § 1412(d).
No permit is required under this subchapter for the transportation for dumping or
the dumping of fish wastes, except when deposited in harbors or other protected or
enclosed coastal waters, or where the Administrator finds that such deposits could
endanger health, the environment, or ecological systems in a specific location.
"16 U.S.C. § 1451 (Supp. II, 1972), amending 33 U.S.C. §1101 (1970).
"Id. § 1452(b). Congress did not intend to preempt state authority. S. REP. No. 753, 92d Cong.,
2d Sess. I (1972).
-1d. § 1454 - 1455. These grants may be made in an amount up to 66 2/3 percent of the costs
incurred by the State.
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established by the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, as amended . . or
(2) established by the Federal Government or by any state or local government
pursuant to such Acts."
Although states are not required to follow federal requirements in developing
management plans, unless federal requirements are followed no grant will be
issued. Since development and administration of such plans require large ex-
penditures, the states are left with little alternative but to follow federal require-
ments. Developing plans for management of the territorial zone is important
and cannot be discarded. States must either find their own source of funds or
follow federal guidelines in order to fund these plans.
In summary, these three statutes recognize that states have concurrent pow-
ers of control over the territorial zone. In none of these statutes does the federal
government preempt the right of control of the territorial zone for exclusive
federal domain. But in an effort to impose exclusive federal control on this
area, Congress has offered federal money to entice states to follow federal
standards.
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 and the
Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972 are, in effect, a statutory enactment
of the holding in Askew. However, Congress has been unwilling to extend the
holding in Askew beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the States. To date there
has been no judicial determination of whether Askew will be extended beyond
te three mile territorial limit of the States. Therefore, the present status of the
law appears to be that the federal government has exclusive dominion and
power of control beyond the three mile State limit.
V. RECOGNITION OF A TWELVE MILE LIMIT
In all likelihood, the United States will soon adopt a twelve mile territorial
limit. A twelve mile limit for territorial waters may be adopted on an interna-
tional basis as early as the summer of 1974 at the Law of the Sea Conference.
The question of ownership of this nine mile extension will be of great eco-
nomic significance. Superports and offshore power plants are proposed for sites
within the extended areas. Licensing the proposed new uses and the exploitation
of mineral resources found in the submerged lands of this area will mean
tremendous amounts of revenue for the owner. Conflict between federal and
state claims can be expected.
One approach to this conflict would be an extension of the holding of
Askew. 00 Proposed new ocean uses such as superports and offshore power
98ld.
"ld. § 1456.
IwAt present the Court has not considered the issue of extending the Askew holding beyond the
three mile territorial zone. Cf. Union Oil Company of California v. Minier, 437 F.2d 408 (9th Cir.
1970). The Court of Appeals of the Ninth Circuit affirmed an injunction to cease the efforts by
the District Attorney of Santa Barbara County to stop the development by oil companies on the
Outer Continental Shelf. The Court acknowledged that the federal government is authorized to
develop the Outer Continental Shelf by means of private leases under 43 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1970).
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systems threaten possible harm to state interests. To protect their interests, the
states should have authority to prevent uses or consequences hostile to those
interests. However, authority must be found to regulate these new uses.
Upon acceptance of a twelve mile limit to the territorial sea, Congress should
act to transfer authority to the states to license and control activity in the
extended territorial zone. This state authority need not conflict with federal
maritime regulations. The need for extended state ownership and control can
be seen by examining the proposed new uses. For example, a deep water
superport located ten miles off the coast would require a pipeline to an inland
refinery. As authority is now allocated between the federal government and the
states, a pipeline would be controlled by the state for the first three miles and
by the federal government for the last seven miles. Any conflict in regulations
might lead to inconsistent demands being made on the construction of a pipe-
line. Although this is only one example, it demonstrates the need for uniform
control by one governmental body. Because the states already control the area
out to three miles, because the land-based support system will be located in the
states and because the states governments are responsive to local concerns,
Congress should extend state authority to the twelve mile limit, if Congress
recognizes the extended territorial sea.
Stephen M. Kiser
Dan A. Aldridge, Jr.
Holding that a federal power cannot be frustrated by the actions of a county district attorney, the
Court expressly limited its decision by asserting,
Because all of the facts are not before us in this case which deals with the delicate
relationship between state and federal power in an area of vital concern to California
and to the United States, we do not go beyond what is necessary for the decision of this
appeal. Specifically, we do not pass upon the existance of a power in the state to punish
those who, on the Outer Continental Shelf do acts which have an effect upon the shores,
nor do we suggest the limits within which the power, if it exists, might be exercised.
Union Oil Company of California v. Minier, 437 F.2d 408, 411-12 (9th Cir. 1970).
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